Baker Hughes: Greasing the Wheels in Kazakhstan (FCPA Violations and Implementation of a Corporate Ethics and Anti-Corruption Compliance Program by Holtzblatt, Mark & Tschakert, Norbert
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Business Faculty Publications Monte Ahuja College of Business
2014
Baker Hughes: Greasing the Wheels in Kazakhstan
(FCPA Violations and Implementation of a
Corporate Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Compliance Program
Mark Holtzblatt
Cleveland State University, m.holtzblatt@csuohio.edu
Norbert Tschakert
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/bus_facpub
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, and the Finance and
Financial Management Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Publisher's Statement
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of
Accounting Education. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing,
corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this
document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A
definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Accounting Education, 32 (2014);
10.1016/j.jaccedu.2014.01.005
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Monte Ahuja College of Business at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Business Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
library.es@csuohio.edu.
Original Published Citation
Holtzblatt, M., Tschakert, N. (2014). Baker Hughes: Greasing the Wheels in Kazakhstan (FCPA Violations and Implementation of a
Corporate Ethics and Anti-Corruption Compliance Program. Journal of Accounting Education, 32, pp. 36-60.
Baker Hughes: Greasing the wheels in Kazakhstan 
(FCPA violations and implementation of a 
corporate ethics and anti-corruption 
compliance program) 
Mark Holtzblatt" ''' , Norbert Tschakert b.1 
~ MOlltt Ahujo Cotlegt of BUSiness. Cleveland Stale University. 18&1 E. 18th Street Monte Ahuja Holt atilt/and. 
OH 44115-2214, United States 
bBert%n School of Business, Solem State University. 352 La!ayefle Street, Salem, MA 01970, United States 
* Corresponding author. Tel. : +1 2168759711: fax: +1 2166879212. 
f-rnail addresses: m.holn blatt@Csuohio.oou (M. Holublatt), ntsch.)kert@s.llemscAt",edu (N. Tsch;akert). 
1 Tel.: +1 9785426627: fax: +1 978 542 6027. 
1. Introduction 
Put yourself into the position of a new member of the Baker Hughes audit committee. The audit 
committee is crucial to the governance of Baker Hughes through its monitoring of the financial 
accounting, reporting, and internal control processes of the company, Your new responsibilities re­
quire you to assess numerous risks and to evaluate control activities. The audit committee's respon­
sibilities also include: reinforcing and monitoring external audit quality; monitoring the effect of the 
business and regulatory environment on Baker Hughes' compliance program; and ensuring that inter­
nal audit is properly focused on key areas of risk (KPMG Audit Committee Institute, 2012). One impor­
tant area of risk is the risk of corruption, including that related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA): 
Audit Committees are often directly involved in assessing whether management has developed and 
is maintaining an effective compliance program to address corruption risk ...While recent trends 
suggest that FCPA enforcement has increased, guidance from regulators has provided clarity 
regarding proactive steps companies can take to mitigate their corruption exposure. An effectively 
designed, implemented, and managed compliance program tailored to a company's specific risk 
areas is paramount. The audit committee plays an integral role in confirming these objectives 
are met (Deloitte, 2013). 
Baker Hughes is a Texas-based public company that helps the oil and gas industries develop their 
reservoirs. Baker Hughes has 58 ,ODD-plus employees in more than 80 countries (Baker Hughes Inc., 
2013). In 2007, Baker Hughes rose to the top of an exclusive list, but obviously not one that it aspired 
to. On April 26, 2007, the company announced that: 
... it was settling a federal probe alleging that it violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 
and that it would pay fines and penalties in excess of $44 million, which at the time was the largest 
combined punishment under the FCPA (Baker Hughes, 2007a). The company's punishment 
included an $11 million criminal penalty, a $10 million civil penalty, the requirementto disgorge 
almost $20 million in ill-gotten profits and prejudgment interest of $3.1 million. Moreover, the 
company reported that the five-year internal probe cost over $50 million, involved 330 lawyers, 
31 forensic accountants, the review of hundreds of thousands of pages of hard-copy documents 
and 1.69 tetra-bytes of electronic data (the equivalent of 90 million pages) from computers in 
20 cities on four continents (Baker Hughes Inc., 2007b). 
You look out upon your desk at the many documents you have collected in your desire to deter­
mine what had led to such a corporate debacle. The documents include the original court complaint 
of the SEC vs. Baker Hughes and Roy Fearnley, press releases, government publications, IO-K annual 
reports, and other materials. You want to ascertain that Bal<er Hughes was implementing the neces­
sary actions to prevent such problems from recurring. 
At this stage of your review of relevant documents, you had narrowed your investigation to the 
questionable actions of Roy Fearnley, a previously hired employee for operations in Kazakhstan. 
The Republic of Kazakhstan is located in Central Asia and Eastern Europe and it is the ninth largest 
country in the world (Kazakhstan.com, 2013). It holds 4 billion tons of proven recoverable oil reserves 
and is estimated to be in the top-10 oil-producing nations in the world by 2015 (GlobalEdge, Michigan 
State University, 2013). The website of Transparency International lists Kazakhstan as a highly corrupt 
country (Transparency International. 2014). You decide to first investigate the recent trend in the 
number of newly initiated FCPA enforcement actions and the size of penalties assessed. 
2. FCPA enforcement actions and fines are increasing 
The FCPA prohibits companies, employees, and agents from giving anything of value to foreign 
government officials in order to obtain or retain business. The law also requires public companies 
to maintain robust internal controls and accurate record-keeping on the expenditure of corporate 
funds. The U.S. Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 and revised it in 1988. The FCPA was initially cre­
ated in response to corporate scandals that were discovered in the mid-1970s. At that time, more than 
400 U.S. companies admitted to paying over $300 million in bribes to foreign government officials 
(U.s. Department of State. 20m). 
For the first 30 years of the FCPA, enforcement actions were relatively rare, with only a few cases a 
year. Recently, the Department of Justice (DO]), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and foreign regulators have increased their enforcement activities. 
This is in part due to the PATRIOT Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and a series of international 
anti-corruption conventions. International agreements targeting foreign corruption include the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery ofForeign Public Officials in International Business Transactions created 
in 1997, and the UK Bribery Act of 2010. Exhibit 1 displays the increase, starting in 2007, of FCPA 
enforcement cases by the SEC and the DO]. 
In addition to the increased frequency of FCPA enforcement actions, there are larger fines awaiting 
violators. Scott Friestad, the SEC's Deputy Director for the Enforcement Division, predicted at an SEC 
presentation on November 24, 2008, "The dollar amounts in the cases that will be coming within 
the next short while will dwarf the disgorgement and penalty amounts that have been obtained in 
prior cases." 
As can be seen in Exhibit 2, Mr. Friestad's prediction has come true. 
3. BaI<er Hughes crosses the bribery line 
3.1. Media reports regarding Baker Hughes FCPA transgressions 
During your review as a Baker Hughes audit committee member, you were able to compile the fol­
lowing information and history regarding the numerous Baker Hughes FCPA transgressions in Kazakh­
stan. The media reports in April 2007 announcing the Baker Hughes FCPA transgressions were hard­
hitting, as seen in the following excerpts from a New York Times article and the Securities and Ex­
change Commission press release (see Exhibit 3). 
3.2. The Karachaganak oilfield project and Karachaganak Integrated Organization (K/o) 
In November 1997, the Government of Kazakhstan and Kazakhoil, Kazakhstan'S national oil com­
pany signed a 40-year Production Sharing Agreement with the members of the Karachaganal< Inte­
grated Organization (I<l0). KIO members included: (1) Eni-AGIP S.p.A. (Italy); (2) British Gas 











Exhibit 2. Rising penalties from FCPA violations by the SEC and DOj. Source: Miller Chevalier (2011). 
Exploration and Production Ltd. (United Kingdom); (3) ChevronTexaco (United States); and (4) Lukoil 
Oil Co. (Russia). The purpose of the KIO is the development of the Karachaganak oil project located in 
Aksai, Kazal<hstan (Karachaganak Petroleum Operating. 2002). Exhibit 4 displays the location of the oil 
field project. 
To help develop the oil field project, the KIO members decided to contract with an oil drilling ser­
vices company. Services sought by KIO induded project management, oil drilling, logistics, and 
engineering. 
Kazakhoil was in charge of managing all oil and gas operations in Kazakhstan. Thus, KIO sought 
Kazakhoil's approval during various phases of the contract-bidding process. Baker Hughes believed 
that the probability of winning the KID oil services contract depended, to a great extent, on Kazakhoil's 
approval. 
Revenue from the KIO contract was anticipated to be in the range of $200 million. A high-ranking 
Baker Hughes' executive stated in November of 1999 that winning the Karachaganak oil-field contract 
was "crucial for the future health of Baker Hughes in Kazakhstan" (SEC v. BrI. 2007). 
3.3. Baker Hughes and the /(/0 tender process 
During your review of the SEC vs. Baker Hughes court complaint, you have constructed the follow­
ing timeline of relevant events that related to the KIO contract bidding process: 
October 1998: 
• Baker Hughes learns about the KIO oil drilling services contract and prepares its bid. 
December 1998: 
• 	Roy Fearnley, Baker Hughes' Business Development Manager for Kazakhstan, was appointed "Team 
Leader" to manage Baker Hughes' contract bid. 
• Fearnley made 	contact with a high-level executive of Kazakhoil, who possessed significant 
decision-making authority on the KIO contract. 
Baker Hughes Admits to Overseas Bribery 
By flo)'d Norris, PublishedApnl27, 2007 
Baker Hughes, a large oil semees company, pleaded guilty yesterday!o violating the foreign 
corrupt practices act by bribing foreign officials. an action that continued even after the 
company promised in 2001 to stop making such payments. 
The oiminal charges covered payments to win oU field contracts in Kazakhstan. but the 
company also settled civil charges fued by the Securities and Exchange Commission accusing it 
ofmaking illegal payments in five other countries - Angola. Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia and 
Uzbekistan. 
Source: Norris (2007) 
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

Litigation Release No. 200941 April 26,2007 

SEC ChargesBakerHughes with Foreign Bribery and with Violating a 
2001 Commission Cease-and-Desist Order 
Baker Hughes Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Three Felony Charges In a 
Criminal Action Filed by the Department ofJustice; Criminal Fines, Civil 
Penalties and Disgorgement of Illicit Profits Total More Than $44 Million 
Source: U.S. SEC (2007 aJ 
Exhibit 3. Media reports announcing Baker Hughes FCPA transgressions. (See aboveHlllcntioned references for further 
information). 
Late 1999: 
• Baker Hughes is notified that its pre-qualification was successful, and it received the documents 
needed to prepare its bid. Bidding preparation then commenced. 
February 2000: 
• Baker Hughes submitted its contract bid to the KIO for the Karachaganak oil services project. Baker 
Hughes' bid did not contain a provision for hiring an agent nor was such a hiring foreseen or con­
sidered necessary to win the bid. 
September 12, 2000: 
• Fearnley informed his supervisor at the Baker Hughes headquarters in Houston, Texas, the VP of 
Marketing, that he had heard unofficially that Baker Hughes was the winner of the Karachaganak 
oil services contract bid and that confirmation would be forthcoming (within a week). 
Exhibit 4. The Karachaganai< Oil Field Project location. Source: Crude Accountabili[y (2013), 
3.4. Baker Hughes approached by "Kazakhoil ... through an agent" 
3.4.1. The request for a commission 
As you continue your review of the SEC court complaint, you discover a series of alarming quotes 
from September 14, 2000: 
• "Kazakhoil requested that Baker Hughes hire an agent in connection with the Karachaganak tender 
(bid)." 
• "I have heard rumors that the Kazakhs are looking for an agency agreement. I hope not at this late 
stage." 
• "As you know ... Kazal<hoil approached me through an agent in London stating that to get the 
Kazakhoil approval a commission is required." 
• "If one of our competitors comes in with a pot of gold, it is not going to be our contract." 
After reading these quotes, you write down the notes shown in (Exhibit 5) regarding events that 
had occurred after September 14, 2000. 
This last-minute request for commissions to an agent was disconcerting because the FCPA ex­
pressly prohibits corrupt payments made through third parties or intermediaries. Specifically, it cov­
ers payments made to any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value 
will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official (DOl & SEC, 2012). Many 
companies doing business in a foreign country retain a local individual or company to help them con­
duct business. Although these foreign agents may provide entirely legitimate advice regarding local 
customs and procedures and may help facilitate business transactions, companies should be aware 
of the risks involved in engaging third-party agents or intermediaries. The fact that a bribe is paid 
by a third party does not eliminate the potential for criminal or civil FCPA liability (DOl & SEC, 2012). 
Exhibit S. Notes taken from court complaint 
Common warning signs or red flags associated with third parties include: 
• Excessive commissions to third-party agents or consultants. 
• Third-party "consulting agreements" that include only vaguely described services. 
• The third party is related to or closely associated with the foreign official. 
• The third party became part of the transaction at the express request or insistence of the foreign 
official. 
• The third party is merely a shell company incorporated in an offshore jurisdiction. 
• The third party requests payment to offshore banl< accounts (DO) & SEC. 2012). 
3.4.2. Baker Hughes hires the agent 
Fearnley began to survey the division vice-presidents for their support of the commission. By the 
following morning (Monday, September 25, 2000), approvals had been obtained from senior officials 
of the relevant divisions of Baker Hughes. 
Fearnley now attempted to finalize the agency contract with the agent, a company located in the 
Isle of Man led by an individual citizen and resident of the UK. The agent was later identified in 201 0, 
by leaked U.S. diplomatic dispatches (released by WikiLeal<s), as being Robert Kissin, a UK banker 
(Leigh. 2010). On September 24 and 25, 2000, Fearnley confirmed with the agent Baker Hughes' agree­
ment to pay the 2% commission for the Karachaganal< project based on the revenues generated from 
the project and a separate agreement that would appoint the agent as Baker Hughes' agent for all fu­
ture services in Kazakhstan at a commission of 3% of revenues invoiced by Baker Hughes on all of its 
future Kazal<hstan projects (SEC v. BH, 2007). 
Fearnley's e-mail to the agent referred to the connection between the commission payment and the 
approval of Baker Hughes' bid: "you will note the consideration has been greatly increased and trust 
this will receive the recognition it deserves in the necessary corners of Kazakhstan in confirming their 
support to Baker Hughes" (SEC v. BH, 2007). On September 26, 2000, on the same day that Kazakhoil 
was expected to support, or not support the Baker Hughes' bid, Fearnley finalized the commission 
agreement with the agent in the Isle of Man. 
By September 29, 2000, Baker Hughes had retained the agent. The agreement provided for a 2% 
commission on revenues generated from the Karachaganak project, and it was dependent on Baker 
Hughes "being confirmed the winner of the tender and awarded the 3-year contract (SEC v. BH, 
2007)." The agreement contained no FCPA language at all. Exhibit 6 shows a graphical representation 
of the entities and transactions involved in the Baker Hughes FCPA violations in Kazakhstan. 
3.5. Baker Hughes' internal controls fail to stop the hiring of the agent 
On or about October 4, 2000, the VP of Marketing informed a Baker Hughes' senior attorney that the 
company was going to hire an agent linked to the Karachaganak oil field project and that the Baker 
Exhibit 6. The entities and transactions involved in the Baker Hughes FCPA case. 
Hughes legal division should communicate with Fearnley to obtain further details. The senior attorney 
sent Fearnley a copy of Baker Hughes' updated standard FCPA documentation (updated January 2000) 
including standardized documents for agent contracts, an agent's questionnaire, a questionnaire on 
the agent's references and a certification for the agent to execute. The senior attorney questioned 
whether the updated procedures had been followed. Fearnley stated that he would try to substitute 
an agreement using the updated, approved, document, and said: "There are still some issues such 
as a Dun and Bradstreet search to be done but I will follow all the issues as notified and advise you 
if we have any issues not in compliance with the thorough documents and procedures received" 
(SEC v. BH, 2007). 
Fearnley did not follow any of the FCPA procedures communicated to him by Baker Hughes' legal 
division and the division did not follow up with Fearnley. Nobody verified that the updated FCPA pro­
cedures had been followed and nobody performed any significant due diligence on the agent until 
2003. 
3.6. Baker Hughes is awarded the Karachaganak tender 
On October 12. 2000. less than three weeks after hiring the agent to represent Baker Hughes' in 
Kazakhstan and over a year subsequent to Baker Hughes trying to win the contract. Fearnley learned 
that Baker Hughes would be receiving communication from the KID selecting Baker Hughes as the 
winner of the Karachaganal< contract. Soon thereafter. Bal<er Hughes was officially awarded the 
Karachaganak contract. During May 2001, Baker Hughes started the first of a series of payments to 
the agent according to the agreement, equal to 2% of revenues generated by the Karachaganak oil field 
project (SEC v. BH. 2007). 
3.6.1. Payments to the agent 
During the years 2001-2003, Bal<er Hughes made 27 commission payments totaling about $4.1 
million to the agent in the Isle of Man, related to the Karachaganak oil field project contract. The 
payments were calculated as being a 2% commission on net revenues earned by Bal<er Hughes on 
the project. Despite the fact that the agent was a company registered in the Isle of Man, allegedly 
providing services for Baker Hughes in Kazakhstan, every commission paid was disbursed from a Ba­
ker Hughes' U.S. account to a bank account located in London under the name of the agent (SEC v. 
BH,2007). 
The commissions paid were subsequently recorded in the accounting system of Baker Hughes and 
inaccurately classified as "commissions," "fees," or "legal services." There were no legal or other ser­
vices provided by the agent for Baker Hughes. Baker Hughes earned about $220 million in total reve­
nues on the Karachaganak oil field project (SEC v. BH, 2007). 
3.7. The judgment 
Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, Baker Hughes consented to the entry of a final 
judgment permanently disallowing any future violations of the FCPA and ordering it to pay a civil pen­
alty and disgorgement with prejudgment interest' (SEC, 2007b). 
The Commission acknowledged Baker Hughes' cooperation in the investigation. In a related crim­
inal proceeding, the United States Department of justice filed criminal FCPA charges against Baker 
Hughes and its wholly owned subsidiary Baker Hughes Services International, Inc. Baker Hughes Ser­
vices International, Inc., which has an office in Atyrau, Kazakhstan, entered a guilty plea and "agreed to 
plead guilty to one count of violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, one count of aiding and 
abetting the falsification of the books and records of Baker Hughes, and one count of conspiracy to vio­
late the FCPA, as well as to pay a criminal fine of $11 million. The Department of justice also entered 
into an agreement with Baker Hughes to defer prosecution for two years on charges of violating the 
anti-bribery and books and records provisions of the FCPA. Under the agreement, the company con­
sented to retain for a period of three years an independent monitor to review and assess the com­
pany's compliance program and monitor its implementation of and compliance with new internal 
policies and procedures" (SEC. 2007b). 
4. LacI< of internal controls 
During your audit committee review of documents, you discover that "according to Baker Hughes' 
settlement agreements with the DOj and the SEC, the company maintained insufficient internal con­
trols to avoid FCPA violations. The FCPA contains an obligation for public companies such as Baker 
Hughes to maintain robust internal controls. The settlement documents identify several of the firm's 
alleged shortcomings, including the following: 
- Baker Hughes had roughly 650 business intermediaries (reduced to fewer than 80 as a result of 
the internal investigation and settlements) around the world, including local sales agents hired 
to help identify potential business transactions and to promote the company to prospective 
customers. According to the SEC and DOj, Baker Hughes did not conduct adequate due diligence 
on its intermediaries to ensure that they had a reputation for ethical business conduct, were 
qualified to perform the services for which they had been retained, or were not inappropriately 
close to influential government officials. The company repeatedly retained the services of local 
agents without determining who owned or controlled the agents. Sales commissions were 
unreasonably large, and in some instances, negotiated by a foreign official on behalf of an 
agent. 
2 Disgorgement forces a violator to give up the amount by which he or she was unjustly enriched (American Bar Association. 
2007). Prejudgment interest is interest that is added to a judgment from the time of the violation to the date of the judgment 
(Hasen, 2012). 
- The company had no written agreements with many of its intermediaries. It paid intermediaries 
outside of their home jurisdictions. In short. according to the SEC. Baker Hughes retained and made 
payments to intermediaries under circumstances in which the company failed to adequately 
ensure itself that such payments were not being passed on to foreign officials. 
Baker Hughes appears to have lacked sufficient accounting controls to ensure that payments made 
using corporate funds were appropriate and consistent with the law. Agents were sometimes paid in 
cash. One agent received payments in five different bank accounts outside of his home jurisdiction. 
Payments were made for an option to lease land from a company in Kazakhstan after a Baker Hughes 
employee determined that the company was only a front for the real owners who are influential. 
Agents were reimbursed for expenses incurred in providing personal travel to foreign officials and 
their families. Commission payments to a local agent were described in the company's books and re­
cords as "legal fees" (SEC v. BH, 2007). 
5. Balcer Hughes' renewed commitment to strong ethics and legal compliance 
After completing your audit committee review of the history of Baker Hughes' questionable pay­
ments in Kazakhstan and violations of internal control, you are encouraged by the subsequent actions 
of the company's management. Following the settlements with the DO] and the SEC, Chad Deaton, for­
mer chairman and chief executive officer of Baker Hughes, said: 
Since the commencement of these investigations in 2002, we have cooperated fully with the SEC 
and DO]. We conducted our own rigorous, independent investigation and we have openly shared' 
our findings with these agencies. The acts which resulted in these enforcement actions are contrary 
to our core values, our policies and our expectations for ethical behavior. The company has termi­
nated employees and commercial agents that it believes were directly involved. In addition, we 
have further strengthened the compliance culture within the company by making extensive 
improvements and enhancements to our compliance program (Baker Hughes, Inc .. 2007b). 
Our employees and management have demonstrated their strong commitment to ethical business 
conduct and strict compliance with the law over the past several years, and the progress of our pro­
grams to benchmark and to continue to improve our compliance are on track. There is no doubt that 
our renewed commitment to strong ethics and legal compliance complements our Best-in-Class 
technology and our reputation for reliability and project execution (Baker Hughes, Inc., 2007b). 
Over the ensuing years Bal<er Hughes embarked on a process to continuously improve its compli­
ance program to a best-in-class standard and to minimize the role that commercial agents play in their 
business model. Mr. Deaton said: 
The significant steps we have taken over the past few years to strengthen our global compliance 
program will play an important role in reinforcing this company's strong historical reputation 
for integrity and ethical behavior. Baker Hughes is committed to continued improvement in our 
compliance program with particular emphasis on the FCPA. We are ready to work closely with 
the compliance monitor to demonstrate the effectiveness of our current compliance program 
and to build upon the improvements we have already made (Baker Hughes. Inc .. 2007b). 
You also discover that Baker Hughes publishes and periodically updates several policy booklets as 
part of their ethics and compliance programs. The two booldets are entitled: {l) "Baker Hughes 
Business Code of Conduct" (Baker Hughes Inc .. 2010), and (2) "Baker Hughes Guide to Complying 
with the FCPA" (Baker Hughes Inc .. 2011). 
6. Case questions 
1. 	In the four-minute video History of the FCPA (PBS, 2009) (http://youtu.be!glnOkaU4s). former 
SEC Assistant Director Richard Grimes states that there are three parts of the FCPA that relate 
to both the accounting and bribery provisions. The U.S. DO] also provides "An Overview" 
(DOj, 2013) of the FCPA provisions (www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa). Requirements: (a) 
Describe briefly what the three FCPA parts referenced in the video are; and (b) describe briefly 
how Bal<er Hughes violated these accounting and bribery provisions in its Kazakhstan 
operations. 
2. 	In responding to the 2007 penalties, Baker Hughes has created an FCPA Compliance Guide (Baker 
Hughes, Inc., 20]1) that facilitates employee understanding and compliance with the FCPA 
( www.bakerhughes.com/company /com pliance /foreign-corru pt-practices-act). Refer to Section 2 
of the guide on page 14 and describe Baker Hughes' "Financial Integrity" requirements. 
3. 	Access the source document entitled A Resource Guide to the US. Foreign COlTllpt Practices Act 
(U.S. DOj & SEC, 2012) provided on the SEC website (www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa­
resource-guide.pdf). What are the criminal and civil penalties for both individuals and corpora­
tions in violation of the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA? 
4. The case mentions local laws such as Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) of 2002 (U.s. Congress, 2002) and 
the UK Bribery Act of 2010 (Legislation.gov.uk, 2010), as well as international anti-bribery 
agreements that have been created by the OECD in 1997 (OECD, 1997). As a Bal<er Hughes audit 
committee member, what would you want Baker Hughes employees to be aware of as regards 
SOX, the UK Bribery Act, and the OECD Convention? 
5. 	What are the components of an effective Corporate Ethics and Anti-Corruption Compliance Pro­
gram that audit committee members should consider implementing when facing risks similar 
to the FCPA risks that Baker Hughes faced? Refer to the April 26, 2007 Baker Hughes press 
release (Norris, 2007), which is available on the Baker Hughes website under the tab titled 
"Press Room" (www.bakerhughes.com/news-and-meclia/media-center/press-releases/4-26­
2007 -4-30-00-pm-baker-hughes-settles-previollsly-disclosed-fcpa-investigations). 
6. 	Various "red flags" can provide clues and tip a company off as to where FCPA risks may be luri<­
ing. During your audit committee review, you accessed the PowerPoint presentation, slides 21­
25, by jay Martin, Baker Hughes' Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer, that was given on 
june 5, 2008 (Martin, 2008) and reviewed the "red flags" listed there (www.docstoc.com/docs/ 
2363177/Bal<er-Hughes-lncorporated-FCPA-Due-Diligence-Review-of-Non-U.S). In your opin­
ion, which of the warning signs were likely present during the Kazakhstan FCPA violations? 
Describe the specific Baker Hughes case fact or action that relates to each red flag. 
7. The COSO report "Internal Control-Integrated Framework" (COSO, 2013) is the most commonly 
used and understood framework for evaluating internal controls over financial reporting. Since 
anti-bribery compliance programs are part of internal control, understanding the COSO frame­
work is useful. Access the COSO Framework Executive Summary (www.coso.org/documents/ 
990025P _Executive_Summary_finaLmay20_e.pclf). List and discuss each of the five compo­
nents for effective internal control. Do you think that adherence to the COSO framework would 
have had the capacity to prevent Baker Hughes' FCPA violations? Why or why not? 
8. 	As a Baker Hughes audit committee member, you want to determine that the company per­
formed the proper accounting and disclosure of the Kazakhstan violations and settlement. 
Access the Baker Hughes 10-Ks for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 (Baker Hughes, 
2005, 2006, 2007c, 200S) from the SEC website (www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/company­
search.html) and do the following: (a) For each year, conduct a search (using the Control + F 
keys) for the word "FCPA." How did Baker Hughes account and disclose its Kazakhstan risk 
exposure during each of the four years? In your opinion, was their accounting treatment cor­
rect? (b) Using the most recent 10-Ks available, how did Baker Hughes' revenue develop in 
the years subsequent to 20077 Were Baker Hughes' revenues negatively impacted by the cessa­
tion of bribery activities under the FCPA? 
9. 	To what extent do external auditors have a responsibility to detect violations of the FCPA? What 
specific actions must external auditors take to discover fraud and illegal acts? Refer to AU 317 
Illegal Acts by Clients (PCAOS, AU 317) and AU 316 Consideration of Fraud in a Financial State­
ment Audit (PCAOB. AU 316). 
10. 	In your opinion, what action should (a) an audit committee member, (b) an external auditor, 
and (c) an employee take if he/she detects a possible violation of the FCPA? 
7. Teaching notes 
7.1. Background and learning objectives 
7.1.1. Background 
The World Bank estimates that more than $1 trillion is paid in bribes each year (World Bank, 2004). 
Transparency International explains: "Corruption destroys entrepreneurship, inhibits free markets 
and undermines the stability vital to successful economies. It also enables an enormous flow of illicit 
money outside the real economy - in the form of unpaid taxes, bribes and laundered funds" (Trans­
parency International. 2012). Corruption can only be fought successfully if people refuse to participate 
in corrupt activities (Siegelman & Biegelman, 201 0). Even though at first sight corruption may seem to 
benefit individual businesses, businesses overall would benefit greatly if corruption could be reduced 
(Loughman & SibelY, 2012). 
The Baker Hughes case therefore addresses an important problem typically not dealt with enough 
in the accounting curriculum. Since 2007, the Department of justice, FBI, SEC, and foreign regulators 
have sharply increased their FCPA and anti-bribery enforcement activities. FCPA penalties and costs 
of internal investigations are a significant cost for both corporations and individuals. Accounting firms 
are increasing their FCPA compliance and anti-bribery services to businesses. These significant events 
and trends are occurring in the US and globally, and accounting educators should strongly consider 
bringing the FCPA and anti-bribery issues into the classroom. 
However, the coverage of the FCPA in textbooks and the accounting curriculum has severely lagged 
these developments. Exhibit TN-1 shows the author's analysis of FCPA coverage within leading 
accounting and business law textbooks. As can be seen, the coverage of the FCPA is scant in accounting 
textbooks. FCPA coverage within business law textbooks is also lacking, and does not include in-depth 
discussion of the FCPA's internal control or accurate bool<s and record-keeping provisions. The expe­
riences with this disconnect between the real-world FCPA developments and available academic 
materials have led to the creation of this case. 
In accordance with the Pathways Commission recommendation to encourage more collaboration 
between accounting practitioners and academicians, the authors organized a panel at the 2013 AAA 
Annual Meeting in Anaheim, "The Importance of the FCPA to Accounting Education." One of the FCPA 
practitioner panelists, Marcus Wong of EY, emphasized that the FCPA is a topic that should be covered 
in multiple courses within the accounting and business curriculum, not just a single course. This case 
was written with that goal in mind and the case can be used in numerous courses such as interna­
tional accounting, auditing, AIS, and forensic accounting. 
In 2013, the FCPA case "Nature's Sunshine Products: Anatomy of an FCPA Failure" was published in 
Issues in Accounting Education (August 2013, Vol. 28, No.3, pp. 599-610). There are some similarities 
between the Nature's Sunshine Products case and the Baker Hughes case, but there are also very sig­
nificant differences as to scope, penalties, topics covered, and supplementary and complementary 
materials. Exhibit TN-2 shows a comparison of the similarities and differences of the two FCPA cases. 
The Baker Hughes case involved significantly higher and more diverse penalties and fines in addition 
to a $50 million cost of internal investigation. The Bal<er Hughes case also covers the topics of external 
auditor responsibilities and FCPA compliance programs, which are absent in the Nature's Sunshine 
Products case. The Baker Hughes case is written in second person which immerses the student in a 
more direct and realistic situation. Finally, the Baker Hughes case provides a dedicated complemen­
tary website with numerous original source SEC, DOj, and company documents, in addition to engag­
ing FCPA related videos. The dedicated website for the Baker Hughes case also contains a set of 
PowerPoint slides that instructors can use to stimulate and enhance in-class discussion of the topic 
and case. 
At the outset of the case, students are put into the perspective of a newly appointed audit commit­
tee member at Baker Hughes, subsequent to the company's 2007 SEC and DOj settlements. The audit 
committee member is trying to learn about the FCPA violations the company committed in Kazakh­
stan in the late 1990s through 2003, and is also trying to evaluate the company's subsequent compli­
ance program activities, which began in 2007 and continue until today, to avoid similar violations 
from occurring. The case provides students with a real-world scenario of a FCPA bribery case and 
(A) Schedule of FCPA coverage In the leading auditing textbooks 
Auditing textbook title and authors Publication 
date 
Edition Publisher Total 
pages 
Pages of FCPA 
coverage 
fCPA Cases cited 
within Textbook 
1. Audltfng: ARlsk-Sased Approach to Conducting A Quality Audit 
Johnstone, Gramlinl(. and Riuenber. 
2014 '" SouthwC!stern '" 1 P~l1! 111.631) (l)Tri!cn Energy/ram 1991 
2. Auditing & Assurance Services: ASystematic Approach 
Messler, Glover, ~nd Pl'ilwilt 
2014 '" M<;Gr~w.HIIt ." ){ page (po 712) (1) Siemens from 2003 
3. Auditing and Assurance 5etVices 
Arens, Elder, and Beasley 
2014 "'h Peuson ... 1 pmgl1lph (p.127) none 
4. Principles ofAuditing & Other AssuranceServlces 
WhlttlnJrt~n, and Pan 
2014 '~h McGraw-Hill .W }I: p~8e (p. 245) none 
(8) Schedule of FCPA coverage in the leading accounting information systems (AIS) textbooks 
AIS textbook title and authors Publication Edition Publisher Total Pages of FCPA FCPA cases cIted 
date pages coverage wIthIn Textbook 
1. Accounting Information Systems 2012 ,,~ Prentice Hill '" 1 pa~8111ph (p.l85) none Romney. and Stein bart 
2. Accounting Information Systems "" "h (englge ." ,,0< none Hail 
3. Care Concepts 0/Accounting In/ormation Systems 2012 12th JohnWlley& '" 15ent~nCe (po 21S) non~ Slmkln,Rose,and Normin ,,,' 
4. Accounting Information Systems 2012 .. Sollth­ '" 1 ~nttnCC! (po 232) nant Gelinas, 01111, and Wheeler Westem 
(C) Schedule of FCPA coverage In the leading international accounting textbooks 
International accounting textbook title and authors Publication EdItion Publisher Total Pages of FCPA FCPA cases cited 
date pales coveral!:e within Textbook 
1. International Accounting 2012 
'''' 
McGrilw·HIII '" 3 p;ges{p.711-714) (I) GE-1992.{2J lAekheed-Ooupnlk, and Perel1l ~~gtS' (3)Saybolt-1998. 
(4 Montedj~en-lg96 
2. International Accounting 2011 "h Purson '" "'" none Chol. and Meek 
3. Comparative International Accaunting 2012 ,,~ Pcal1cn '" nane none Nobel. lind Pilrker 
(0) Schedule of FCPA coverage In the leading business law textbooks 
Business law textbook title and authors Pages of FCPA FCPA cases cited 
date 
Publication Edition Publisher Total 
pages coverage within Textbook 
2012 1296 }Ii p~8e (p. 94Sjand nane 
Milnn. and Roberts 
1. Smith and Roberson's Business Low GensaB'"'h 
}Ii pale (p.l001) 
2014 Prentice Hall .00 1 pal1lSl7lph (p.S12) mme 
Cheeseman 
2. Contemporary Bus/ness Low "h 
2012 12th Cenlage }Ii page (p. 106) none 
Clilwen. Mitior, and Cross 
13923. Business Low: Text and Cases 
Exhibit TN~1. FCPA coverage in accounting and business law textbooi{s. 
allows them to explore the difficulties in the decision-making with which companies can be con­
fronted in international business. 
7.2. Learning objectives 
The FCPA is a law that has three major sections: (1) Anti-bribery; (2) Accurate books and record­
l(eeping; and (3) Functioning internal control. In addition, there are other significant anti-bribery reg­
ulations and related auditing standards. The benefit is that students are provided with a holistic per­
spective of the FCPA and bribery risk issues, rather than a narrow perspective of the problem. Thus, the 
case has been designed to achieve the following learning objectives (LOs): 
(LO 1): Understanding of the importance of the FCPA in global business (i.e., trends, 
provisions for bribery, accounting, internal control, and penalties for violations) 
(LO 2): Knowledge of the ethical considerations of FCPA related activities and actions that can 
be tal(en to ensure employee compliance with company policies (FCPA Compliance 
Guides and Codes of Conduct) 
(LO 3): Knowledge of how FCPA violations are reported in the financial statements and 
disclosed in the footnotes 
(LO 4): Knowledge of auditor responsibilities in the occurrence of fraud (related to FCPA 
violations and COSO internal control standards) 
(LO 5): Awareness of how to recognize possible FCPA violations (i.e., "red flags") 
(LO 6): Understanding of the options and procedures available to auditors, audit committee 
members, and employees regarding actions and reporting of possible FCPA violations 
FCPA Case Company Baker Hughes FCPA Case Nature's Sunshine 
Journal of publication (year) Journal of Accounting Education, Products FCPA Case 
(2014) Issues in Accounting Education, 
(2013) 
Industrv Oil Services Natural Remedies 
Countf;"involved with bribes Kazakhstan Brazil 
Years that bribes were Daid 2001 to 2003 2000 to 2001 
Total of briberv-n.vments $ 4.1 million "more than $1 million" 
Recipient(s) of bribes 3'"party agent in Isle of Man, Customs brokers with some 
funds transferred to Kazakhoil funds going to customs officials 
officials in Brazil 
Year of Settlement with SEC 2007 2009 
Penalties assessed $11 million criminal fine-DOJ $600,000 civil penalty for 
$10 million civil penalty-SEC company and $50,000 fine for 
$23 million disgorgement two executives 
3-year compliance program and 
monitor 
Tonics Covered in Case 
FCPA Anti~briberv-nrovisions Yes Yes 
FCPA Accurate books "rovisions Yes Yes 
FCPA Internal control provisions Yes Yes 
"Red Flal!s" to identifv FCPA risks Yes Yes 
External auditor resnonsibilities Yes No 
Company FCPA Guide and 
comoliance orOlrram Yes No 
Key employees and bribery 
recipients identified with their Yes No 
violations detailed 
Case perspective Written in second person with the 
student put in the position of a 
newly appointed member of the Written in third person 
Baker Hughes audit committee 
reviewing the company FCPA 
violations and the appropriateness 
of the company response 
Written assignments required? Yes - 10 questions No - 2 questions with a 
Supplemental question 
Dedicated case website with SEC and 
DOJ FCPA Resource Guide, FCPA Yes No 
videos, and Company lO-Ks, Company 
FCPA Compliance Guide, and 
Comnanv Code of Conduct 
Case PowerPoint Slides provided for Yes No 
instructor 
Exhibit TN-2. FCPA case similarities and differences - Baker Hughes Case OAEd) vs. Nature's Sunshine Products Case (IAE). 
7.3, Implementation guidance 
7.3.1, Incorporating the case into the accounting curriculum and intended audience 
This case can be incorporated in a variety of classes both at the graduate and the undergraduate 
levels, It can be used in the international accounting, AIS, and forensic accounting courses, especially 
for those class sessions focusing upon internal control and compliance systems, The Baker Hughes 
case can also be used in auditing classes as a comprehensive case covering various chapters such as 
internal control, fraud, and ethics. Finally, for those universities that are offering a separate accounting 
ethics course within their curriculum, this case would be appropriate, Within the ethics class, sessions 
that focus upon corporate codes of conduct or specific FCPA guidelines would find this case especially 
applicable, 
The fraud committed by Baker Hughes is of such magnitude that multiple cases can be derived 
from it. Instructors can therefore deviate from the provided case to adjust it to their respective class 
content and need. For example, the topic of internal control could be emphasized even more, requiring 
more detail on the components of a sound control environment and the "tone at the top." Likewise, 
the role and responsibility of the internal auditors could be explored and the IMA Statement of Ethical 
Professional Practice could be used. Business law students could analyze further details of the FCPA as 
well as additional cases filed by the SEC and the Department of Justice. 
This case has been used at two universities over two semesters in international accounting as well 
as auditing classes. The case was assigned on an individual basis, although it is also feasible as a group 
project. 
7.3.2. Mapping of the case topics to the Las and case questions 
Exhibit TN-3 maps the case topics to the learning objectives and case questions. This mapping 
serves two purposes: (1) to enable instructors to understand the scope of the topics that are encom­
passed by FCPA issues and that are contained within the Baker Hughes case; and (2) to provide a tool 
to enable instructors to assign questions to students that are relevant to desired learning objectives 
and course goals. 
7.3.3. Case website with SEC, DO], and company Documents, and FCPA videos 
Students were provided with the dedicated case website www.accountingcase.com. which has 
links to helpful resources such as the text of the FCPA, SEC and DOJ documents, Baker Hughes' 10­
Ks, and FCPA and bribery videos. Even though this help was provided, students still had to research 
the various documents and were able to experience firsthand the difficulties in analyzing complex 
documents and information. Professors can choose to either refer their students to use or not use 
the website depending on instructor preferences and time available to research the case. The website 
includes all the documents, videos and links for student research of the case questions and facilitates 
directed research. A screenshot of the case website is provided in Exhibit TN-4. 
7.4. Evidence regarding case efficacy 
The case was provided to 131 students at two universities over the course of two semesters, Fall 
2012 and Spring 2013. At university one, two sections of auditing students, one in each semester, 
worked through the case. At university two, four sections of international accounting students, two 
in each semester, worked through the case. Students were asked to fill out an assessment question­
naire at the due date of the assignment. Responses were made on a five-point Likert-type scale 
(Strongly Agree -1, Agree-2, Neutral-3, Disagree-4, and Strongly Disagree-5). Exhibit TN-5 shows 
the mean responses for each question. 
The statements posed to the students were designed to assess the efficacy of the case in meeting 
the case learning objectives and the students' overall view of the case. The first six statements in Ex­
hibitTN-5 relate to the case learning objectives and the survey scores ranging from 1.59 to 1.80 indi­
cate that the six learning objectives are supported through the case. 
Statements 7-9 related to the students' perceptions of the case's interest and relevancy, and the 
importance of the FCPA for accountants. Students at both universities found the case interesting 
and relevant and believe the FCPA is an important topic for accountants. Some of the students had 
heard about the FCPA before the case was assigned. 
The remaining questions showed students responded very favorably to the website provided. They 
accessed the 10 K filings on the SEC Edgar Online website and reviewed and described Bal<er Hughes' 
FCPA-related disclosures. Students believe that the case is valuable for their career and that it prepares 
them to better deal with ethical challenges in the workplace. 
Furthermore, the assessment shows that responses are quite homogeneous. With the exception of 
the question "I did not know about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act before this case was assigned," 
students rarely opted for "disagree" or "strongly disagree" in their responses. 
There were no meaningful deviations in student responses between the fall 2012 and spring 2013 
semester or the different sections at the two universities. 
FCPA and related anti-
bribery regulations and 
auditing standards 
FCPA related 
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Exhibit TN-3. Baker Hughes case topics mapped to the teaming objectives (LO) and case questions (Q). 
The questionnaire also included two open-ended questions which most of the students used to 
provide additional feedback. Student responses to the question "What did you like most about the 
BH FCPA Case?" included: 
- "It was an actual case and interesting to see the effects, especially how Baker Hughes is a 
'world class leader' against bribes now." 
- "I originally thought to provide commissions in the business world is normal. But now I know 
it could become an illegal act and should be taken into concern. As an auditor, we should be 
aware of this issue." 
- "I enjoyed learning and researching a real case. Reading how the company accepts and denies 
fraud and how they attempted to conceal it was very interesting." 
- "I like how it was well explained and all the information that was available. I liked how it made 
me think independently about the subject and be more aware of the rules and regulations." 
- "The online resources that went along with the case and the questions. It made it easier to 
understand everything and answer the questions." 
- "I like how the case showed how the tone of upper management pushed the employees to 
commit violations as well as employees lacl< of due diligence in regards to FCPA. This case 
made me aware of FCPA, which I [had J never heard existed." 
.-\U<HIllliuC.u.ulD Hom. 
General FCPA Resources 
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Exhibit 1N-4. Dedicated website for the Baker Hughes FCPA case. 
"I feel the research necessary to answer the case questions was similar to what we would 

expect in our careers." 

"I liked the way the case was written. The moment I started reading I was very interested in 

finishing. I also liked that it brought out the detective in me." 

"The u.s. is being a good example for other countries. I wish my country would do the same." 

"The application of a real-life situation mixed with accounting principles and reports helped 

me enjoy the case." 





University 1 University 2 Both Universities 
Number of Students in Class 41 90 131 
Learning Obiectives Survey Questions (LO 1-6) 
1 My understanding of the importance of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act was increased by working on this case (LO 1) 1.71 1.50 1.56 
2 The Baker Hughes FCPA case increased my knowledge 
knowiedae about the importance of Business Ethics (LO 2) 1.73 1.72 1.73 
3 The Baker Hughes FCPA case increased my knowledge 
about FCPA related disclosures in financial statements and 
footnotes (LO 3) 
1.80 1.71 1.74 
4 The Baker Hughes FCPA case increased my knowledge about 
auditor responsibilities in the occurrence of fraud (LO 4) 1.73 1.74 1.74 
5 After working through the case, I have a better awareness to 
recoonize possible FCPA violations (LO 5) 1.68 1.56 1.60 
6 I have a better understanding of the options available to me 
should I encounter possible FCPA violations in the workplace 
(LO 6) 
1.59 1.63 1.62 
Other Survey Questions 
7 I found the Baker Hu~hes FCPA case interesting 1.63 1.57 1.59 
8 I found the Baker Hughes FCPA case relevant because it is 
based on a real~world company 1.41 1.33 1.36 
9 I believe that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is a timely and 
important topic for accountants 1.61 1.43 1.49 
10 I did not know about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act before 
this case was assi aned 2.20 2.54 2.44 
11 I have accessed the Baker Hughes Financial Statements on the 
SEC Edgar Online Website by using the provided links on 
www.accountingcasc.colll 
1.51 1.48 1.49 
12 I found the infonnation provided on accountingcase.com useful 
in heipina me to solve this case 1.44 1.23 1.30 
13 I believe that having knowledge about the FCPA will be 
valuable for my career 1.51 1.49 1.50 
14 The Baker Hughes case and related questions required me to use 
critical thinking skills 1.73 1.59 1.63 
15 Overall, the Baker Hughes FCPA case was a good learning 
experience 1.49 1.40 1.43 
Average 1.65 1.60 1.61 
Exhibit TN-S. Student responses to case assessment questionnaire. 
Student responses to the question "What suggestions for improvement to the case do you have?" 
included: 
- "None, it was great!" 
- "No improvements needed. This is one of the better cases I have worked on." 
- 'The case is well prepared. Nothing should be changed. Every question targets a different 
answer from a different area." 
- "Communicate what you are expecting in terms of answers." 
8. Suggested solutions to the case discussion questions 
This section presents suggested answers to the ten questions assigned to this case. 
Question t (LO t): In the four-minute video, History of the FCPA (PBS, 2009) (http://youtu.be/ 
glnOkaLi4s), former SEC Assistant Director Richard Grimes states that there are three parts of the 
FCPA that relate to both accounting and bribery provisions. The U.S. DOJ also provides "An Overview" 
(DOJ, 2013) of the FCPA provisions (www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa). Requirements: (a) Describe 
briefly what the three FCPA parts referenced in the video are; and (b) describe briefly how Baker 
Hughes violated these accounting and bribery provisions in its Kazakhstan operations. 
(a) Do not bribe foreign officials. The FCPA prohibits companies, employees, and agents from giv­
ing anything of value to foreign government officials in order to obtain or retain business. 
Keep accurate books and records. Publicly listed companies have to maintain accurate books, 
records, and accounts which - in reasonable detail - accurately and fairly reflect the transac­
tions of the company. 
Establish and maintain strong internal controls. Publicly listed companies have to ensure that 
transactions are executed in accordance with management's authorization, that access to assets 
is permitted only in accordance with management's authorization, that financial statements are 
in accordance with u.s. GMP, and that accounting records are compared with existing assets at 
reasonable intervals.The aforementioned rules are known as the anti-bribery and books and re­
cords provisions of the FCPA. 
(b) Baker Hughes violated 	all three requirements. Baker Hughes and their intermediaries and 
agents paid bribes to foreign officials over an extended amount of time. Baker Hughes' top man­
agement discussed these bribes in detail and also asked their subcontractors to participate in 
paying for the bribe. Baker Hughes recorded the bribes as commissions, fees, and legal services, 
even though no legal or other identifiable service was performed for Baker Hughes. Internal 
control at Baker Hughes failed as there was no investigation into the dealings of Baker Hughes' 
agent in Kazakhstan, as well as no follow-up from Baker Hughes' legal department on concerns 
the legal department had raised in regards to FCPA compliance. Furthermore, Baker Hughes had 
a poor control environment, as the tone at the top failed to prevent the bribery. Multiple exec­
utives had knowledge of the bribes and failed to stop the payment of bribes. Baker Hughes vio­
lated u.s. GMP as the significant payments were intentionally accounted for in incorrect 
accounts in an attempt to conceal the bribes. 
Question 2 (LO 2, LO 3): In responding to the 2007 penalties, Baker Hughes has created a FCPA 
Compliance Guide (Baker Hughes, Inc.. 20]]) that facilitates employee understanding and compli­
ance with the FCPA (www.bakerhughes.com/company/colllpliance/foreign-corrupt-practices-act). 
Refer to Section 2 of the guide on page 14 and describe Baker Hughes' "Financial Integrity" 
requirements. 
In its financial integrity requirements, Baker Hughes establishes its commitment to the highest 
standards of accuracy and completeness in the documentation and reporting of financial account­
ing. All financial information must reflect actual transactions and conform to u.S. GMP or local 
GMP, as applicable. Employees are prohibited from making any false or misleading book entries 
and employees are directed to maintain a system of internal control that provides reasonable 
assurance that all transactions are executed according to management's authorization. 
Question 3 (LO 1): Access the source document entitled A Resource Guide to the u.s. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (U.S. DO] & SEC. 2012) provided on the SEC website (www.sec.gov/spotlighr/fcpa/fcpa-re­
source-guide. pdf). What are the criminal and civil penalties for both individuals and corporations in 
violation of the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA? 
(a) Criminal penalties 
For each violation of the anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA provides that corporations are subject to 
a fine of up to $2 million. Individuals, including officers, directors, stockholders, and agents of compa­
nies, are subject to a fine of up to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to five years. 
For each violation of the accounting provisions, the FCPA provides that corporations and other busi­
ness entities are subject to a fine of up to $25 million. Individuals are subject to a fine of up to $5 mil­
lion and imprisonment for up to 20 years. 
(b) Civil penalties 
For violations of the anti-bribery provisions, corporations are subject to a civil penalty of up to 
$16,000 per violation, Individuals, including officers, directors, stockholders, and agents of the compa­
nies, are similarly subject to a civil penalty of up to $16,000 per violation, which may not be paid by 
their employer or principal. 
For violations of the accounting provisions, the SEC may obtain a civil penalty not to exceed the 
greater of (a) the gross amount of the pecuniary gain to the defendant as a result of the violations, 
or (b) a specified dollar limitation. 
Question 4 (LOt, LO 2): The case mentioned local laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 
2002 (U.s. Congress, 2002) and the UK Bribery Act of2010 (Legislation.gov.uk, 2010), as well as inter­
national anti-bribery agreements that have been created by the OECD in 1997 (OECD, 1997). As a Ba­
ker Hughes audit committee member, what would you want Bal<er Hughes' employees to be aware of 
as regards SOX, the UK Bribery Act, and the OECD Convention? 
Employees should be aware of additional laws that relate to bribery and business ethics. sox intro­
duced reforms to strengthen internal control, requires the company's principal officers to certify the 
integrity of their company's financial reports, mandates that public companies offer whistleblower 
hotlines, and requires management and the external auditor to report on the adequacy of the com­
pany's internal control on financial reporting. The UI{ Bribery Act of2010 covers individuals and com­
panies that carry on business in the UK and does not include an exception for facilitating payments. 
Recipients of bribes can also be charged and bribes can be provided to a broader range of individuals 
rather than only foreign or government officials to make the act applicable. The OECD Convention 
was adopted by 40 countries (including the US) and establishes legally binding standards to criminal­
ize bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions. Each country has to under­
go a peer review examination and the reports are made publicly available. 
Question 5 (LO 2, LO 6): What are the components of an effective Corporate Ethics and Anti-Cor­
ruption Compliance Program that audit committee members should consider implementing when fac­
ing risks similar to the FCPA risks that Baker Hughes faced? Refer to the April 26, 2007 Baker Hughes 
press release (Norris, 2007), which is available on the Baker Hughes website under the tab entitled 
"Press Room" ( www.bakerhughes.col11/news-and-l11od ia/l11eclia-center / press-releases/4-26-2007 -4-
30-00-pm-baker-hughes-settles-previously-disclosed-fcpa-investigations). 
If a company is subject to increased FCPA risks, management should consider the following mea­
sures to reduce the company's exposure to FCPA violations: 
- Adopting enterprise-wide FCPA compliance policies. 
- Establishing a strong whistleblower program that encourages early reporting of all potential FCPA 
violations and ensures no retaliation against whistleblowers. 
- Providing computer-based and live FCPA compliance training to all employees. 
- Taking swift disciplinary action including termination for non-compliance with the company's pol­
icies and procedures. 
- Reducing the use of agents to obtain business. 
- Certifying remaining agents for FCPA compliance. 
- Conducting more internal audits in foreign countries. 
Question 6 (LO 5): Various "Red Flags" can provide clues and tip a company off as to where FCPA 
risks may be lurking. During your audit committee review, you accessed the PowerPoint presentation, 
slides 21-25, by jay Martin, Baker Hughes' Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer, that was given 
on june 5, 2008 (Martin, 2008) and reviewed the "red flags" listed there (www.c1ocstoc.com/docs/ 
2363177/Baker-Hughes-lncorporatecl-FCPA-Due-Diligence-Reviow-of-Non-U.S). In your opinion, 
which of the warning signs were likely present during the Kazakhstan FCPA violations? Describe 
the specific Baker Hughes case fact or action that relates to each red flag. 
The red flags listed injay Martin's presentation that were present at Baker Hughes were: Rumors of 
improper payments; retention of unnecessary third parties (agent registered in the Isle of Man); con­
voluted payment requests (2% of the Kazakh oil services contract); unusually large commissions (more 
than $4 million were paid from 2001 to 2003): doing business in a country with Imown corruption 
issues (Transparency International rated Kazakhstan as highly corrupt at the time of the Baker Hughes 
contract bidding): third-parry non-US representative requesting up-front payments (agent registered 
in the Isle of Man with payments to a bank in London): third-party non-US representative having close 
relationships with government officials: and misrepresentation and inconsistencies in the application 
of the FCPA due diligence process of the third-party non-US representative (Roy Fearnley failed to 
abide by the Baker Hughes FCPA due diligence process). 
Question 7 (LO 2, LO 4): The COSO report "Internal Control-Integrated Framework" (Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), 2013) is the most commonly used and 
understood framework for evaluating internal controls over financial reporting. Since anti-bribery 
compliance programs are part of internal control, understanding the COSO framework is useful. Access 
the COSO Framework Executive Summary (www.coso.orgjdocumentsj990025P_Executive_Sum­
mary_finaLmay20_e.pdf). List and discuss each of the five components for effective internal control. 
Do you think that adherence to the COSO framework would have had the capacity to prevent Baker 
Hughes' FCPA violations? Why or why not? 
The current COSO framework (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commis­
sion (COSO), 1992) will be in effect until December 15, 2014, with early adoption of the new COSO 
framework encouraged. The changes in the COSO framework do not affect the five components for 
effective internal control. According to the COSO framework, the five components of effective internal 
control are: (1) The control environment, (2) risk assessment, (3) control activities, (4) information 
and communication and (5) monitoring activities. The control environment is the foundation for 
all other components of internal control and is often referred to as the "tone at the top," which is 
set by senior management and the board of directors. Risl< assessment refers to the organization's 
identification and analysis of risks that have the capacity to adversely affect the organization's objec­
tives. Control activities include policies and procedures that help ensure that necessary actions are 
taken to address potential risks. Infonnation and communication describes the nature and quality 
of information needed for effective internal control and monitoring activities include ongoing and 
separate evaluations of the components of internal control. 
Following the COSO framework would have had the capacity to prevent FCPA violations at Baker 
Hughes. A more ethical tone at the top, the follow-up of internal control on identified risks, and more 
control and monitoring activities would have exposed the proposed bribes and characterized them as 
unacceptable. Strong internal controls reduce the opportunities for management override, something 
that occurred at Baker Hughes. 
Students can further utilize the seventeen principles listed in the new COSO framework to better 
explain the five components and how they relate to Baker Hughes' internal control deficiencies and 
FCPA violations. 
Question 8 (LO 3): As a Baker Hughes audit committee member, you want to determine that the 
company performed the proper accounting and disclosure of the Kazakhstan violations and settle­
ment. Access the Bal<er Hughes 10-Ks for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 (Baker Hughes, Inc., 
2005, Baker Hughes, Inc., 2006, Baker Hughes Inc., 2007c: Baker Hughes Inc.. 2008) from the SEC web­
site (www.sec.govjedgarjsearchedgarjcompanysearch.html) and do the following: (a) for each year, 
conduct a search (using the Control + F keys) for the word "FCPA." How did Baker Hughes account 
and disclose its Kazakhstan risk exposure during each of the four years? In your opinion, was their 
accounting treatment correct? (b) Using the most recent 1 O-Ks available, how did Baker Hughes' rev­
enue develop in the years subsequent to 20077 Were Baker Hughes' revenues negatively impacted by 
the cessation of bribery activities under the FCPA? 
Baker Hughes' disclosures regarding their FCPA violations increased over time. Prior to the settle­
ment made in 2007, in the lO-K of 2005, footnote disclosure (Note 16. Commitments and Contingen­
cies) was properly made of the litigation contingency related to the Baker Hughes situation in 
Kazakhstan. This was the proper treatment under U.S. GMP for contingent liability accounting. A sim­
ilar footnote disclosure was made in 2006 (Note 15). In 2007, the footnote contingent liability disclo­
sure (Note 15) also included the details of the settlement agreement with the SEC. The 2008 financial 
statements included a full and accurate description of the settlement as follows: 
Under the settlements in connection with the previously disclosed compliance investigations by the DO] 
and SEC, we are subject to ongoing review and regulation of our business operations, including the 
review of our operations and compliance program by an independent monitor appointed to assess 
our Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ('FCPA') policies and procedures. The activities of the independent 
monitor will have a cost to us and may cause a change in our processes and operations, the outcome 
of which we are unable to predict. In addition, the settlements may impact our operations or result in 
legal actions against us in the countries that are the subject ofthe settlements. Also, the collateral impact 
of settlement in the United States and other countries outside the United States where we do business 
that may claim jurisdiction over any of the matters related to the DO] and SEC settlements could be 
material. These settlements could also result in third-party claims against us, which may include claims 
for special, indirect, derivative or consequential damages... Under the settlements with the DO] and SEC, 
we are subject to a two-year deferred prosecution agreement and enjoined by the federal district court 
against any further violations of the FCPA. Accordingly, the settlements reached with the DO] and SEC 
could be substantially nullified and we could be subject to severe sanctions and civil and criminal pros-
ecution as well as fines and penalties in the event ofa subsequent violation by us or any ofour employ-
ees or our failure to meet all of the conditions contained in the settlements. The impact of the settlements 
on our ongoing operations could include limits on revenue growth and increases in operating costs. Our 
ability to comply with the terms of the settlements is dependent on the success of our ongoing compli-
ance program, including our ability to continue to manage our agents and business partners and super-
vise, train and retain competent employees and the efforts of our employees to comply with applicable 
law and the Baker Hughes Business Code of Conduct. 
Baker Hughes' revenue in USD million during the years 2007-2012 was as follows: 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
$10,428 $11,864 $9,664 $14,414 $19,831 $21,361 
Based on these numbers, the often-made argument that bribes are necessary or else the business 
collapses and employees have to be terminated does not hold true. Baker Hughes was able to focus on 
other areas and was able to be very successful while in compliance with the FCPA. 
The financial statements disclose the payment of penalties but do not allow for the detection of the 
amount of bribes paid to the agent and the expenses Bal<er Hughes incurred due to its internal inves­
tigation. This is due to the highly aggregate nature of the presentation, as well as the high revenue of 
Baker Hughes. 
Question 9 (LO 4): To what extent do external auditors have a responsibility to detect violations of 
the FCPA? What specific actions must external auditors take to discover fraud and illegal acts? Refer to 
AU 317 lllegal Acts by Clients (PCADS, AU 317) and AU 316 Consideration of Fraud in a Financial State­
ment Audit (PCADS, AU 316). 
External auditors have a responsibility to detect material misstatements in financial statements, 
whether arising from error or fraud. All members of the audit team have to meet for a brainstorming 
session during which financial statement areas that might be susceptible to fraud are identified. The 
session should also include a discussion of how management could perpetrate and conceal fraudulent 
financial reporting and how assets of the entity could be misappropriated. The brainstorming session 
can also influence the audit program and the level of professional skepticism, which demands a ques­
tioning mind and critical assessment of audit evidence. In addition, auditors have to obtain informa­
tion in order to identify risks of material misstatements due to fraud, e.g., through management 
inquiry, analytical procedures, and inquiry of the company's legal counsel. Auditors are also required 
to consider the possibility of fraud throughout the audit. 
The following issues limit the auditor's ability to detect illegal acts: many illegal acts are not closely 
tied to financial statements and as such are difficult to detect for the external auditor; auditors lack 
the education of attorneys, which makes it difficult for auditors to determine whether an action is 
in fact a violation of the law; and auditors do not conduct a full investigation of all transactions, 
but rather provide reasonable assurance that is based on testing parts of the overall population. 
Because of these limitations, external auditors do not have explicit responsibilities in uncovering FCPA 
violations, but have to follow up on any red flags or indications for FCPA violations they become aware 
of during the audit. Students can also refer to the more recent PCAOB AS 12 (Identifying and Assessing 
Risks of Material Misstatements) and PCAOB AS 13 (The Auditor's Responses to the Risks of Material 
Misstatements). Alternatively, a professor teaching an auditing class could ask additional questions 
relating to these standards. 
Question 10 (LO 2, LO 4, LO 6): In your opinion, what action should (a) an audit committee mem­
ber, (b) an external auditor and (c) an employee take if he/she detects a possible violation of the FCPA? 
A review of the AICPA or IMA ethical guidelines for CPAs and CMAs is helpful in answering this 
question. In general, internal issues that the company faces should not be communicated to anyone 
outside of the organization including authorities and attempts should first be made to resolve the is­
sue internally. 
(a) An audit committee member is in a meaningful position to combat FCPA violations and can 
request an investigation into the possible FCPA violation. The audit committee oversees the 
internal and external audit function and is responsible to ensure that the company's financial 
reporting is transparent, consistent, and accurate. The audit committee member should bring 
the issue to the attention of the full board as well as management and then follow up on sub­
sequent results and determinations. The audit committee member should ensure that his or her 
concerns are accurately reflected in the minutes. 
(b) External auditors have a responsibility to follow up on suspicions of possible violations of the 
law. At the very least, they have to address the issue to either management or the audit com­
mittee, depending on the severeness of the violation. Suspected FCPA violations would however 
call for an involvement of the audit committee. If the violation results in the financial state­
ments not representing fairly the true economic position of the company, the auditor needs 
to assess the implications of the violation on the auditor's report. The auditor also needs to eval­
uate his or her relationship to management in light of a possible management misrepresenta­
tion and its implication on the auditor's ability to continue the audit. 
(c) 	An employee should first review all relevant company policies and should follow these policies. 
The employee should then contact his or her immediate supervisor, assuming the supervisor is 
not involved in the violation. If no satisfactory solution is accomplished, the employee should 
submit the issue to the next management level and inform his or her immediate supervisor 
of this step, again assuming the supervisor is not involved. Employees that prefer to stay anon­
ymous can contact the company ethics hotline. Employees can furthermore retain their own 
counsel and can choose to resign from their position. 
9. Conclusion 
The major contribution of this case lies in students learning about the importance of business eth­
ics, strong corporate governance, and internal control - and the possible consequences if such are 
missing. The learning of specific FCPA rules is an added and important benefit as FCPA violations 
and corresponding enforcement actions have increased substantially in recent years. Overall, the 
assessment results indicate that the case achieves important learning objectives and that students find 
it relevant and valuable. 
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